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The Effect of the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 on
Saving and Investment
by Cori McNeilus
In 1981 , Congress passed the controversial Economic Recovery Tax Act
(ERT A). ERT A reduced personal income tax rates and provided a new accelerated depreciation system for business. Supporters of the legislation
predicted that the increased after-tax returns produced by these tax reductions would encourage saving and investment. This article examines th e
political history and economic theo ry behind the tax cuts and the impact
th ese changes may have had on saving and investment.

Political Background
Prior to 1977, the Republicans advocated balancing the Federal budget
by increased taxes and decreased spending. This policy hurt them politi cally. A change came early in 1977 when the Republican minority in Congress proposed an across-the-board tax cut. Republican Senator Jack Kemp
argued that a decrease in taxes would increase savings, capital formation , productivity, rea~wages, and job opportunities . Democrats, on the
other hand, argued that the tax cut would increase the deficit. The following year, some Democrats joined the advocates of tax cuts . In 1978, the
Nunn Amendment (sponsored by Senator Sam Nunn , Democrat from
Georgia) proposed a decrease in the personal income tax rate and a
decrease in federal spending.
Although the Nunn Amendment was defeated during the Carter Administration , there were growing numbers of tax cut advocates in both
parties in Congress . These advocates found support for their views from
the country' s experience with tax cuts in the sixties . President Kennedy' s
advisers had recommended a decrease in taxes to stimulate consumer
spending. Several tax cuts were ennacted between 1962 and 1965, including cuts in personal income tax, and investment tax c redits and an

Cori McNeilus

Page 15

acce lerated depreciation schedule for business. Following these _tax cuts,
co nsumer spendi ng declined (contrary to expectatio ns) , but savi ng and
investment rose (Brown , 1988, p. 28).
Wh il e Cong ress debated tax rates , the co untry suffered a recession in
1978 and infl at ion rose to 13 .3 percent. As wages rose with inflation , peopl e were placed in higher tax brackets that constrained their sta ndard
of li ving. Furthermore, an increase in the labor force and a decrease in
ca pital formation (a declining capi tal/labor ratio) hurt productivity. Yet
another problem was a decline in saving and in vestment. All these factors were in place when Ronald Reagan became President and urged tax
cuts as a part of supply-side eco nomic policies.

Supply-Side Economics and Tax Changes
One of the goals of supply-side econom ics was to improve the economy
by increasing production through incentives to save and invest. The ERTA
of 1981 reflected this goal . It implemented across-the-board tax cuts to
increase after-tax return s that would give people liquidity and incentives
to save and invest. In 1981 individual income taxes were reduced across
the board by 5 percent and a 10 pe rcent decrease was planned for both
1982 and 1983 (Economic Report of the President, 1982, p . 614) .
The ERTA reduced busin ess taxes as well as those of individuals . It was
designed to increase business investm ent by decreasing th e effective tax
rate (the ratio of tax payments to pre-tax profits) on new investm ent. To
do this ERTA increased the investment tax credit, increased depreciation
write-offs, and decreased th e average tax rates on profits .
Supply-side economics predicts that beyond a certain point, high tax
rates decrease tax revenue . A tax cut would , in theory, increase growth ,
reduce the use of tax shelters, lessen the incentive for tax evasion and ,
thereby, increase tax revenue .
Advocates of supply-side policies argued that higher tax rates on the
upper income group decreased tax revenue as members of this group
reduced saving and investment. ERTA reduced the top tax rate on perso nal income from 70 to 50 percent, thus placing more of the tax burden
on the middle and lower income groups (Peterson, 1988, p. 613). The
top five to ten percent of earners, however, do two-thirds of the saving
and investment. Accordingly, the best way to have the upper income
group pay more taxes was to reduce tax rates to encourage investment.
This would keep the economy growing and all would benefit (Brookes,
1982, p. 58).

Page 16

Draftings in Economics

Suppl y-side t heo ry notwithstanding, a rec ess ion did occur in 1981. As
th e deficit soared an d unemployment increased from 7. 1 percent to 10.8
perce nt, Co ngress re-exa mined its tax cut pol icy and passed t he Tax Equity
and Fisca l Res po nsibi lity Act (TEFRA) in 1982 (McComas, 1984, p. 54).
O verall, TEFRA res ulted in a 95 bil lion dollar tax increase. Fo r ind ivid uals,
pe rsona l inco me taxes we re inc reased . For business, the accelerated cost
recove ry all owance was ca nce ll ed and the basi s for depreciation was
decreased by o ne- half.

Changes in Saving and Investment: 1981-84
Stat ist ica lly, t he effects of the 1981- 1982 tax changes d id not meet expectatio ns. Whi le some propon ents of ERTA predicted th at savi ngs wou ld
increase from 6 pe rce nt of d isposab le income in 1980 to 8 percent in
1984, in actu ality savi ngs decl ined to 4.9% in 1983 and c limbed to its
o ri ginal 1980 leve l of 6% in 1984 (Mccomas, 1984, p. 54) . A lso, so me
eco no mists pred icted t hat t hese tax c hanges would in crease investment
fro m 11.5 pe rcent of G NP in 1981 to 14.5 pe rcent in 1984. H owever,
investm ent ro se to o nl y 12 .3 pe rce nt of G NP in 1984 (McComas, 1984,
p. 54).
A number of factors may expl ain wh y savin g and investm ent d id not
grow as pred icted . First, th e recessio n in th e early eighti es, influ enced
by t he Federal Rese rve' s ti ghtenin g of th e mon ey supp ly, redu ced saving
and investment. Seco nd, th e stock market rall y in 1983 also may have
decreased t he level of savin g; as stoc k va lu es rose, in d ividu als' net wort h
inc reased, res ultin g in more spe nd ing. Th ird , t he 198 2 tax in c rease
res ulting from TEFRA may have partia ll y offset t he pos itive effects on savin g and in vestm ent expected fro m ERTA . Fin ally, unce rtai nty abo ut taxes
may adverse ly affect saving and in vestment. Wh en ind ivi du als fee l un ce rta in about incom e tax po lic ies, t hey are afrai d to take risks. As a resu lt,
indi vidu als may increase co nsum pt ion at t he expe nse of savin g, and co rporation s may dec rease o r delay investm ent. In ad dition , tax c hanges
ca use t he IRS to fa ll yea rs be hind in iss uing reg ul ati o ns. Th erefo re, compani es have to interp ret th e law s themse lves and set as id e reserves in case
th eir interpretation s do not matc h those of th e IRS (Alm , 1988, p. 237).
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Studies of Tax Changes and Investment
Martin Feldstein and Lawrence Summers did extensive research on the
effect of inflation and taxation on capital formation . They determined that
under the tax laws of the late 1970' s, the effective tax rates on capital
income w ere greatly increased by inflation and , thereby, offset mu c h of
th e favorable effects of investment tax credits and shorter depreciation
lives on investment . They concluded that the total effective tax rate on
ca pital used in 1977 was 66 percent which increased the amount of taxes
pa id by the corporate sector by 32 billion dollars. Without inflation , they
estimated th e tax rate on capital would have been only 41 percent . The
higher effective tax rate would tend to lower the rate of cap ital formati o n, move investment to areas where the tax rules don' t apply, and cause
misallocations due to the variation among industries (Feldstein , 1979, p.
468) .
There has been controversy, though , over the results of this research.
Questions were raised about methodology and validity. According to Jane
Gravelle, when errors in methodology and validity were corrected, the
data showed that the effective tax rate in 1977 was not 66 percent but
54 percent, less than it had been in 1954 (59 .8 percent) (1980, p. 480) .
She also found t hat the increase in taxes on corporations was not 32.3
billion dollars, as the Feldstein study estimated, but 21 billion dollars. It
would appear that the effect of tax changes on investment remains
controversial .
Other studies on the effects of tax cuts on investment examine the user
cost of capital. According to Auerbach , the rate of return a firm earns
on investment after taxes influences what investment projects will be
undertaken (1983 , p. 909) . Therefore, business will invest as long as the
value of returns to investment after taxes is greater than the cost of the
asset. An increase in taxes wil l decrease incentives to invest as the user
cost of capital increases.
Slemrod estimated that the tax changes in ERTA decreased the user cost
on industrial equipment by only 4 percent from 1980 to 1982, but increased the user cost on office and computing equipment by 2 percent
(1986, p. 63) . However, this study concluded that if TEFRA had not been
enacted in 1982, the user cost of office and computing equipment would
have fallen by 10 percent (1986, p . 64). These figures suggest not only
that ERTA may not have significantly changed the user cost of some equipment, but also that all equipment was not affected the same way.
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Conclusion
The evide nce presented illustrates th e d ifficulty in determining the effects of tax changes on saving and investment. This problem is compound ed by t he ma ny economic variables that coexi st with tax changes. As
d iscussed , these variab les include inflation, recess ion , tax uncertainty,
and use r cost of capital. Thu s ERTA was not t he on ly factor infl uencing
investment in th e early eighties. Even in hind si ght it is often d ifficult to
te ll w hether tax cuts have a major impact on saving and invest me nt.
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